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Abstract 
Bangladesh and Pakistan had very divergent experiences with aid after 1971. Politics in 
Pakistan was less inclusive in terms of opportunities for intermediate class political 
entrepreneurs. In this context, the significant role of military aid to Pakistan had very 
negative effects on its political and economic evolution. In contrast in Bangladesh the less 
centralized organization of political power and less concentrated forms of aid allowed 
intermediate class political entrepreneurs to access resources and created incentives for 
productive activities. These experiences challenge conventional ideas about the relationship 
between aid, good governance and security: better policy requires understanding the 
relationship between aid and the political economies of recipient countries better.  
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1 Introduction 
The different experiences of Bangladesh and Pakistan with aid since 1971 allow us to 
examine the processes through which aid can assist or obstruct the evolution of institutions 
and governance capabilities in countries where the state has been vulnerable to internal or 
external challenges. Aid does appear to affect the development prospects of such countries 
but in more complex ways than assumed in standard theory and policy. Indeed, many simple 
analytical ideas informing the use of aid to achieve improvements in governance are 
misleading and in some contexts have had damaging effects. Bangladesh and Pakistan make 
an interesting comparison because they were the same country till 1971 when a civil war, 
followed by a war of independence led to the emergence of Bangladesh. Bangladesh was 
poorer and less developed, and was famously written off by Henry Kissinger as a ‘basket 
case’ dependent on aid. Both countries had vulnerable democracies after 1971. Both received 
roughly US$50 of foreign aid in nominal terms in the forty years since 1971. While both 
remain poor and vulnerable to internal conflicts, Bangladesh has arguably made greater 
progress given its starting point, while Pakistan has become more fragile. Pakistan’s per 
capita GDP was higher in 1971 and remained higher in 2011, but economic growth has been 
faster in Bangladesh since the 1990s and the gap in per capita GDP narrowed significantly. 
Bangladesh has also done better in terms of a number of social indicators with more rapid 
progress in areas such as infant mortality starting from a more adverse starting point. Its 
manufacturing sector has grown more rapidly, creating jobs for millions in the garments 
industry, while industrial growth in Pakistan has languished. The most striking difference is 
that despite intense internal conflicts in its early years, Bangladesh appears to have moved 
towards relatively lower levels of internal violence and greater political stability (but progress 
remains vulnerable to reverses) while Pakistan appears to have generally moved in the 
opposite direction. In the 2010s Pakistan faced more violent and disruptive internal conflicts 
and more severe threats to its state.  
Aid is clearly just one factor amongst many that may explain the divergent trajectories of the 
two countries. Despite the common elements in their histories, there were important 
differences in their contexts. These differences included the composition and types of aid the 
two countries received. Military aid played a more important role in Pakistan due to its 
geopolitical position and this reinforced the already significant position of the army and 
security-related interests in the politics of resource allocation in Pakistan. Bangladesh did not 
have a comparable level of security significance for donors and the absence of security aid 
meant that ruling elites found it more difficult to establish centralized control over aid. 
Bangladesh was also a more homogenous country and the war of independence mobilized 
many people, particularly in the ‘intermediate’ (middle and lower-middle) classes, to expect 
greater participation and progress. Many of these expectations were not realized and indeed 
created much turbulence in the years after independence. But the less centralized organization 
of political power in Bangladesh allowed more intermediate class political entrepreneurs to 
enter politics and capture ‘rents’. This had a social cost in terms of political corruption but 
also a social benefit in stabilizing the polity. In Pakistan the social opening under Bhutto was 
driven from above to a much greater extent and old elites continued to dominate the political 
process. The failure of the political system to rapidly absorb intermediate class political 
organizers and the loss of legitimacy of the ruling elites supporting US interventions in the 
region were to have dire consequences for the internal stability of Pakistan.  
Particularly unfortunate for Pakistan was the fact that two periods of military rule in the 
1980s and 2000s were periods when the US was involved in regional conflicts and pumped 
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military and security aid into Pakistan to buy its support. The combination of military 
governments and concentrated flows of security-related aid to the top leadership had 
significant and adverse effects on the economic and political dynamics of the country. In 
contrast in Bangladesh, the allocation of aid could not be tightly controlled from above, and it 
was easier for new political entrepreneurs from the lower-middle classes to compete with 
existing elites. In addition, because ruling elites could not control aid resources from above as 
a strategy of maintaining political power, they had somewhat greater compulsions to support 
the development of productive capacity. Military regimes in Bangladesh therefore actively 
supported industrialization to a greater extent as the development of the productive sector 
was an important part of their own survival strategies.  
We discuss the effects of aid on governance using an analysis of rents and rent seeking. State 
policies and interventions create ‘rents’, which are incomes for some individuals that would 
not exist in the absence of the intervention. Rents can have a legal basis (subsidies, welfare 
policies, protection or aid) but they can be extra-legal or illegal (illegal allocation of public 
contracts or resources to individuals who would otherwise not get them). Politics in all 
countries involves organizations mobilizing to maintain or change policies with the purpose 
of maintaining or changing the allocation of rents. These activities can be broadly described 
as ‘rent seeking’ as they seek to preserve or achieve an allocation of rents. Rent seeking in 
turn can be legal or illegal. In advanced countries, much of politics and therefore rent seeking 
is legal, and is financed by legal fund-raising for political activities, and legal expenditures on 
lobbying by companies and interest groups. In developing countries a much larger part of the 
rent seeking is not strictly legal. Politics is funded by money from grey sources partly 
because resources from the modern formal sector cannot fully finance politics. In addition, 
the rents created are often also extra-legal as powerful political organizers and constituencies 
capture off-budget or illegal rents, partly because legal rents based on allocations of tax 
revenues or regulatory interventions are often insufficient. There are therefore structural 
reasons why developing countries generally do not have characteristics of ‘good governance’ 
defined as governance according to the rule of law, where government is held accountable for 
implementing formal policies through formal processes. However, while no developing 
country scores highly on ‘good governance’, there are significant differences in the 
organization of politics across these countries, and these can make a big difference to their 
development outcomes. Aid can be important in the evolution of the political process because 
it can change the supply of rents, the ways in which these are allocated, and affect the 
strategies and relative strength of different political players. 
From this perspective, differences in the types of aid can interact with local conditions to 
affect not just economic trajectories but also the evolution of social and political strategies. 
The increasing political fragmentation of Pakistan can be examined from this perspective. 
The political violence in Pakistan in the 2010s has multiple causes but an important one is the 
exclusion of important segments of its intermediate classes from playing significant roles in 
rent allocation processes, and their adoption of increasingly aggressive anti-state strategies as 
a result. At the same time ruling elites failed to generate sufficient economic growth and 
employment opportunities, so that excluded political entrepreneurs found it relatively easy to 
mobilize social discontent. A growing number of political groups began to emerge that were 
no longer demanding inclusion, but increasingly challenging the legitimacy of the state itself, 
implicitly to achieve a fundamental restructuring of power. In contrast in Bangladesh, while 
the political competition between opposing parties has been intense and often violent, 
excluded political entrepreneurs have mostly felt that they would eventually gain access to 
politically allocated rents and did not feel the need to target the constitution of the state. As a 
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result, even though ‘live-and-let-live’ compromises have not emerged between competing 
political parties in Bangladesh, and the system is therefore vulnerable to sudden spikes in 
violence, there are no structural reasons why such compromises cannot gradually emerge. 
Moreover, no important political organizations in Bangladesh have so far engaged in violence 
to overthrow the state.  
Two very broad propositions will help to structure our discussion. The first proposition is that 
a gradual incorporation of politically organized groups into legitimate (though not necessarily 
legal) processes of political accumulation is a precondition for maintaining social and 
political stability in developing countries. A second and related proposition is that these 
political processes should be consistent with (and at least should not block) accumulation and 
rent allocation to emerging productive sectors developing their competitiveness to survive in 
a global economy. The different trajectories in our two countries had much to do with their 
different initial conditions. But small differences in aid strategies had significant multiplier 
effects by strengthening retrogressive forces in the evolution of institutions and governance in 
Pakistan and allowing some developmental evolution in Bangladesh. However, it is 
misleading to try to identify the content of what is retrogressive or developmental by using 
the benchmark of ‘good governance’. Both Bangladesh and Pakistan have scored poorly on 
all the standard indicators of ‘good governance’. Nor is it a simple question of state capacity. 
The Pakistani state has significant violence capacity but has been unable to suppress or 
contain violence in society. It is also hard to argue that the administrative capacity of the 
Pakistani state has been lower in some aggregate sense. It may be weak in remote tribal areas 
but not in the population centres of the Punjab or Sind. Instead of these generalizations, our 
analysis focuses on differences in the strategies of economic and political organizations in 
these countries and how these were obstructed or reinforced in particular directions by aid. 
Compared to Pakistan, the rent-capture strategies of ruling elites in Bangladesh were more 
supportive of productive economic activities and for maintaining political stability (though 
both remain very vulnerable). In addition, the extensive activities of relatively high quality 
NGOs sustained a minimal level of service delivery to the very poor.  
The analytical narrative of aid and its development impact presented here challenges two 
different sets of conventional views about the relationship between aid, governance and 
development. The first is that in developing countries like Bangladesh that score poorly on 
‘good governance’, aid should be used to strengthen progress towards ‘good governance’ 
(Hermes and Lensink 2001). The latter requires the protection of property rights, the 
enforcement of a rule of law, low corruption and a government that is accountable. However, 
the experience of Bangladesh and many similar countries suggests that progress on these 
difficult governance goals is very slow and development has to be achieved with limited prior 
improvements in good governance. In these contexts, political stability has often depended on 
an appropriate allocation of rents to powerful political organizations and economic 
development has depended on support being available for firms and sectors that allowed and 
compelled them to develop their competitiveness. Aid to Bangladesh has been relatively 
more developmental because it supported some of these processes and the challenge is to 
move ahead with incremental institutional and policy changes that can sustain and deepen 
this progress. 
The second consensus view is that in countries like Pakistan that are suffering from severe 
security challenges, aid should support improvements in security in addition to good 
governance (World Bank 2011). Many donors such as the UK have included support for 
security (for instance for policing) in their development budgets. The experience of Pakistan 
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challenges this view because here increased security-related aid has been associated with a 
steep decline in the legitimacy of the state and an increase in violence. The achievement of 
political stability requires a distribution of resources across competing political groups 
commensurate with their organizational power. Violence breaks out when the ruling coalition 
does not recognize the true organizational capabilities of some groups and therefore refuses 
to give them a commensurate access to rents. The problem of violence in these contexts 
cannot be solved (as the good governance proponents believe) by the state delivering public 
goods to ‘citizens’ because the state simply does not have enough resources to buy off all 
discontent in this way. If external security support is provided to a ruling coalition that faces 
violent opposition (because it has not achieved an acceptable distribution of rents in the first 
place) it is likely to use more force to sustain the exclusion rather than use the opportunity to 
renegotiate a more stabilizing distribution of rents. A more serious loss of legitimacy can 
follow that can provoke even more violence and a challenge to the institutions of the state and 
not just the government. In Pakistan the legitimacy problem was compounded because the 
ruling coalition was getting security aid in exchange for supporting the US war in 
Afghanistan, which was also widely perceived to be illegitimate. This only added to the 
marked increase in violence associated with growing external security assistance. Section 2 
outlines the analytical framework describing how economic development and political 
stability are related to the competition over economic and political rents. Section 3 provides 
an overview of the trends in aid flows to the two countries. Section 4 evaluates the likely 
effects of aid on the economics and politics of the two countries using our analytical 
framework, and section 5 concludes.  
2  Governance, institutions, and development  
The relationship between aid, development and institutions has to be located in the context of 
a broader discussion about governance and development in developing countries. Developing 
countries typically do not have ‘Weberian’ states that can enforce formal rules to a 
satisfactory extent. There are many reasons for this. At the level of the economy, societies 
only become rule-following when there are many economic organizations which need rules to 
regulate their interactions and when most of them are productive enough to be profitable in 
rule-following ways and profitable enough to collectively pay for the enforcement of these 
rules. In politics societies become rule-following when formal political contributions from 
legal organizations provide enough resources to pay for political organizations and formal 
taxation yields enough resources for a party to win elections on the basis of formal taxing and 
spending programmes. These conditions are not met in the typical developing country and so 
their institutional contexts are typically characterized by significant rule violations (that take 
the form of informality), together with the weak enforcement of formal rights and rules. In 
addition, political corruption and clientelism are much more in evidence as these can describe 
informal rent allocations. As these features characterize all developing countries, the question 
is why are some of them more developmental than others?  
Developing countries that are politically stable and growing rapidly are just as likely to 
demonstrate rule-violating characteristics as the ones failing to develop. However, there are 
significant differences in the types of informality, the precise modifications of formal rights, 
the types of corruption and clientelism, and these differences can help to explain their 
developmental performance. Developing countries that achieve greater success in 
development do so because some of their informal governance arrangements are able to 
support development and maintain political stability. But these developmental governance 
arrangements are likely to be far removed from the expectations of ‘good governance’ 
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defined as the protection of well-defined property rights, a rule of law, low corruption and a 
government accountable to citizens. The countries that are able to achieve development in 
these contexts often do eventually achieve a greater formalization of institutions, better 
defined property rights, more recognizably accountable democracies and are able to gradually 
reduce the more egregious types of corruption. Over time there is therefore a relationship 
between the standard definition of good governance and economic prosperity and political 
stability. However, this relationship is not a simple causal one and the achievement of 
political stability and economic development in developing countries often requires 
governance capabilities that are not easy to understand in terms of ‘good governance’ 
characteristics (Khan, M. 2000a, 2000b, 2004, 2012b).  
We will use an alternative approach that looks at the implications of different types of rights 
and rents to assess if institutions and governance are evolving in the direction of supporting 
greater economic and political viability. If formal and informal institutions support rents that 
maintain sufficient political stability and create opportunities and compulsions for growth, 
some of the necessary conditions for sustainable improvements in formal governance 
conditions are likely to be achieved over a longer term. Growth and political stability do not 
necessarily ensure either the long-term sustainability of a system or its transition towards 
greater formality and a state with Weberian characteristics. However, if the existing 
institutions and governance arrangements do not even achieve economic development with 
acceptable levels of political stability, the long-term sustainability of the system and the 
achievement of better formal governance are very unlikely.  
In a developing country, the institutions and organizations that are relevant for understanding 
its development dynamics are therefore not just the formal ones that policy analysis typically 
focuses on. Informal institutions and organizations are just as important for their effects on 
political stability and economic activity. In particular many political organizations are largely 
informal and carry out activities that informally modify formal institutions as part of their 
rent capture strategies. These modifications of formal institutions (for instance the ways in 
which subsidies are allocated) can influence business and the operations of economic 
organizations. Economic organizations too have large elements of informality in their 
operations partly because of the context of informality in which they operate and the 
necessity of having links with powerful political players and engaging in informal rent-
seeking activities with them. In many cases their initial levels of competitiveness are also too 
low for them to survive without access to rents, and much of this is also provided or captured 
informally. Thus, even in cases where there is economic growth, there are significant 
elements of informality and rule-violating behaviour in the relationship between businesses 
and governments. The impact of aid in a developing country is therefore likely to depend on 
the pre-existing structure of institutions and organizations in the country, both formal and 
informal. The types of aid that are available, and the methods of delivery can interact with 
these ongoing processes to nudge the institutional system in the direction of better outcomes 
in terms of political stability and economic development or the reverse. This is the impact 
that we are interested in assessing. The assessment is largely analytical at this stage rather 
than empirical and is intended to provoke further investigation and research.  
The political economy of aid in our two countries will be examined in the next section using 
a simplified analytical frame looking at the dynamics of political stability and economic 
development. Both are closely related to formal and informal rent-seeking processes. The 
level of political stability in a country depends (though not exclusively) on the allocation of 
rents to powerful political organizations. Political organizations engage in (formal and 
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informal) activities to gain access to different types of rents, which are in turn distributed 
within these organizations and to their supporters in line with the internal distribution of 
organizational power. The rents that political organizations can capture depend on their 
organizational power, and this depends on the rents they promise to allocate (formally and 
informally) to their supporters. The informal elements are important and include mechanisms 
like the preferential granting of contracts and jobs, or overlooking legal violations by 
supporters. Political organizations can use a variety of ideological, regional, ethnic or 
religious claims to define the group and its cohesiveness and success in collective action can 
depend on these non-economic motivations. Nevertheless, at the heart of many conflicts that 
are ostensibly ethnic, religious, regional or ideological there is often a dissatisfied but 
organizationally powerful group of organizers who feel their access to power and rents is less 
than is warranted. The strategies that excluded groups use to organize themselves and 
challenge others depend on the economic, political and social history of the country. A 
country that is on a steady growth path and where the structure of political competition 
allows the gradual inclusion of new groups is likely to have systemic stability even if its 
politics appears to be disorderly. On the other hand, a country where the ruling coalition uses 
a more aggressive strategy of suppressing new organizers and buying out some of their 
supporters with offers from above may appear to be more stable but may build up explosive 
pressures. This is likely to be particularly the case if the strategies of the ruling coalition are 
also damaging for economic growth, limiting the resources that are available for 
redistribution to powerful political organizations.  
Developing countries are stable when excluded groups perceive a good chance of gaining 
access to rents commensurate with their organizational power. Organizational power can be 
demonstrated in ways that are relatively peaceful, such as public demonstrations or electoral 
conflicts. But if the groups competing for rents do not accept the distribution of rents that 
emerges because (in their opinion) it does not reflect the ‘true’ distribution of power; more 
disruptive or violent conflicts can break out to establish what their relative power really is. 
These contests can escalate (as in a Chicken Game) into serious disruptions and violence that 
can last a long time till the distribution of rents comes into line with a perception of the 
distribution of organizational power that is accepted by all parties as realistic. Unfortunately, 
this can involve long periods of conflict, particularly since conflict can itself change the 
relative power of contesting parties. Societies where challenges to the distribution of rents are 
incremental and new groups, entering the political fray are similar to the ones that are already 
the beneficiaries of rents, are more likely to make incremental compromises rapidly and 
smoothly. However, if excluded groups were excluded for a long time, their sudden 
mobilization can result in significant violence because very substantial changes in the 
distribution of rents have to be rapidly organized and no party has a good idea of the 
underlying distribution of power that is sustainable. In these contexts a long period of intense 
conflict can easily be the result (Khan, M. 2010). This is why democratic processes 
associated with political corruption and clientelist politics can be associated with stability in 
some contexts and sudden escalations of instability in others.  
Rents and rent-seeking are also implicated in economic development. Economic 
organizations (like firms) are engaged in both formal and informal links with government and 
some of these links may be vital for their survival. Some business-government links may be 
necessary for protecting property rights and getting access to necessary resources in contexts 
where the formal rule of law, the protection of property rights and the formal policy 
framework supporting firms are weak. Some of this support may be essential for firms to 
develop their technical and organizational capabilities and therefore their competitiveness. 
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Many firms in developing countries are initially not competitive because they lack the 
organizational know-how to organize production. Formal and informal rents with appropriate 
governance conditions can be very important to support the learning-by-doing necessary to 
develop these capabilities (Khan, M. 2012b). However, the business-government links can 
also end up protecting inefficiency and preventing competition, and in these cases the result 
could be economic stagnation and even decline. Here too, the configuration of economic and 
political organizations is important. A configuration of rents where firms can get selective 
short-term support to improve their competitiveness can have very dynamic effects. Here the 
rewards for politicians are the longer-term benefits of economic growth or their participation 
as individuals in productive profit opportunities. A configuration where firms enter into rent-
sharing arrangements with politicians who protect monopolies or help businesses skim public 
resources is likely to be associated with decline. Since aid is an additional source of rents, the 
effects of aid on governance have to be understood in the context of an interaction of aid with 
ongoing processes of economic and political rent allocation.  
3 Aid to Bangladesh and Pakistan: historical trends 
Pakistan had a higher per capita income than Bangladesh in 1971, and the gap increased till 
the 1980s as a result of higher rates of economic growth in Pakistan. After 1990 the relative 
performance of the two countries changed and higher growth rates in Bangladesh began to 
steadily narrow the gap. This is shown in Figure 1. However, even in 2011, the per capita 
income of Pakistan was 14.2 per cent higher, measured in constant 2000 US dollars. Table 1 
summarizes the economic growth in the two countries from the 1960s with India as a 
comparator. The reversal of Pakistan’s fortunes relative to Bangladesh is even more marked 
relative to India. Pakistan was the fastest growing country in the Indian subcontinent till 
around 1990 but after that it has trailed both India and Bangladesh in terms of growth rates.  
Figure 1: Trends in per capita incomes: Bangladesh and Pakistan 
 
Note: Per capita incomes are in logs. 
Source: Based on data in World Bank (2013).  
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Table 1: Growth in the Indian subcontinent, 1960–2010 
Growth rates % India Pakistan Bangladesh 
GDP    
1960-80 3.5 5.5 1.7 
1980-90 5.6 6.1 3.6 
1990-00 5.8 3.7 4.7 
2000-05 6.7 4.9 5.3 
2005-10 7.8 3.9 6.0    
Per capita GDP    
1960-80 1.2 2.6 -0.8 
1980-90 3.4 3.5 1.2 
1990-00 4.0 1.2 2.6 
2000-05 5.2 2.4 3.3 
2005-10 6.4 2.1 4.9 
Source: Based on data in World Bank (2013).  
There are obviously many dimensions to this complex story of relative growth and 
development and a variety of factors contributed to these outcomes. The types of aid to the 
two countries are likely to have a relatively small explanatory significance if we look at them 
as discrete variables affecting significant changes in growth and development in large and 
complex economies. Our aim is rather to look for likely interactions between aid and broader 
economic and political economy factors driving growth in the two countries, with aid perhaps 
playing a bigger role in blocking or accelerating particular types of changes which are also 
likely to have had other important domestic and international factors driving them.  
Table 2 and Table 3 show that in nominal terms aid to Bangladesh roughly doubled between 
the 1970s and the 2000s while in Pakistan it more than tripled. However, since their 
populations roughly doubled over this period, per capita aid to Bangladesh in nominal terms 
remained at around ten dollars at the end of the period as it had been at the beginning, while it 
increased by around 34 per cent in Pakistan. There is no simple correspondence between 
changes in the flows of aid to the two countries and the trends in their performance shown in 
Table 1. In the 1990s when Bangladesh’s growth rate began to exceed that of Pakistan, total 
ODA (overseas development assistance) to Bangladesh declined by 4.3 per cent in nominal 
terms and grew by 8.3 per cent in Pakistan. In per capita terms, there was a decline in both 
countries but with a bigger percentage decline in Bangladesh. In constant dollars, in 
aggregate and in per capita terms, there was a decline in both countries but with a steeper 
percentage decline in Bangladesh. The contrast was even more striking in the 2000s, with per 
capita aid continuing to decline in Bangladesh in both nominal and real terms but with a 
significant increase in aggregate and per capita aid to Pakistan. Yet the gap in the growth 
rates of the two countries further increased after the 1990s.  
Table 2: Trends in total ODA to Bangladesh 
Average annual ODA 
current dollars 
(million) 
Aid per capita 
 in current dollars 
Average annual ODA 
constant 2011 dollars 
(million) 
Aid per capita 
 in constant 2011 
dollars 
1971-80 699.0 9.90 2422.2 34.32 
1981-90 1452.0 15.73 3182.8 34.49 
1991-00 1390.2 11.83 2101.5 17.89 
2000-10 1352.5 9.62 1643.5 11.69 
Source: Based on data in OECD (2013). Per capita figures based on mid-decade population figures from World 
Bank (2013). 
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Table 3: Trends in total ODA to Pakistan 
Average annual ODA 
current dollars 
(million) 
Aid per capita 
 in current dollars 
Average annual ODA 
constant 2011 dollars 
(million) 
Aid per capita 
 in constant 2011 
dollars 
1961-70 413.1 7.95 2719.3 52.30 
1971-80 640.1 9.35 2348.1 34.29 
1981-90 957.5 10.03 2068.5 21.67 
1991-00 1037.2 8.14 1508.2 11.84 
2000-10 1995.7 12.58 2400.8 15.13 
Source: Based on data in OECD (2013). Per capita figures based on mid-decade population figures from World 
Bank (2013).  
Table 4: Aid to Bangladesh, 1971-2010 
Millions of current US$ (percentages are shares of a component in that year) 
Fiscal years Food aid Commodity aid Project aid Average annual aid* 
1971-80 2090 
(32%) 
2768 
(42%) 
1749 
(26%) 
660.7 
1981-90 2346 
(17%) 
4435 
(31%) 
7340 
(52%) 
1412.1 
1991-2000 1537 
(10%) 
3169 
(20%) 
10911 
(70%) 
1561.7 
2001-10 613 
(3%) 
536 
(3%) 
15104 
(94%) 
1625.3 
Total  6586 10908 35104 1315.0 
*Note there are small discrepancies in the figures for total aid disbursed in the data of the GoB and the OECD, 
GoB figures being slightly higher. 
Source: GoB (2011: Based on Tables 1 and 2).  
Table 5: Bangladesh: average annual grants versus loans, 1971–2010 
Millions of US$ (percentages refer to share of that component in that year) 
Fiscal years   Grants Loans Total aid 
1971-80      336.0 (51%)     324.7 (49%) 660.7 
1981-90      674.2 (48%)     737.9 (52%)       1412.1 
1991-2000      737.9 (47%)     823.8 (53%) 1561.7 
2001-10      512.2 (32%)   1113.1 (68%) 1625.3 
Total      565.1 (43%)     749.9 (57%)       1315.0 
Source: GoB ( 2011: Table 3). 
Table 4 shows the changes in the composition of aid to Bangladesh from 1971 to 2010. In 
1971 the war-ravaged nation was dependent on food and commodity aid that constituted 74 
per cent of total aid in the 1970s. By the 2000s, food and commodity aid had declined to six 
per cent of the total, with project aid increasing to 94 per cent. Bangladesh does not get direct 
budget support. As a share of GDP, aid to Bangladesh declined from around 10 per cent of 
GDP in the early years to around 1.5 per cent by 2010.  
In one respect, however, Bangladesh remains an aid dependent country as almost half of 
public investment continues to be financed by aid. The Annual Development Programme or 
ADP finances public infrastructure and developmental projects. The investment component 
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of the ADP that actually gets implemented accounts for around 80 per cent of public 
investment in most years (the rest comes from capital expenditure financed through the 
revenue budget and investments by public sector companies). In the early years, aid 
disbursements covered all of the ADP (Sobhan 1990; Sobhan and Islam 1990). By 2000 
disbursed aid still accounted for 46.8 per cent of the ADP (Obaydullah 2007: 181). This share 
did not reduce significantly in the 2010s. However, as Bangladesh became less poor over 
time, the share of grants in total aid declined and more of the aid was in the form of loans on 
concessionary terms. Table 5 shows that the share of loans in total aid increased from less 
than half of all aid in the 1970s to almost 70 per cent by the 2000s. 
Table 6: Sources of aid to Bangladesh, 1971–2010 (millions of US$) 
Donors Grants Loans Total Share (%) 
   
World Bank 269 11,664 11,933 22.69 
Asian Devt Bank  70 8,114 8,184 15.56 
Japan   3,308 3,753 7,061 13.42 
USA 2,787 763 3,550 6.75 
UN (except UNICEF)   2,744 20 2,764 5.25 
Canada   2,087 16 2,103 4 
United Kingdom   1,973 89 2,062 3.92 
Germany   1,436 268 1,704 3.24 
European Union   1,534 48 1,582 3.01 
Netherlands   1,078 71 1,149 2.18 
Saudi Arabia   587 315 902 1.71 
UNICEF   907 0 907 1.72 
Sweden   794 24 818 1.57 
Denmark   805 68 873 1.66 
Norway   709 6 715 1.34 
France   325 256 581 1.1 
Islamic Devt Bank   22 504 526 1 
India   206 235 441 0.85 
Australia   388 49 437 0.83 
Russia   35 359 394 0.76 
Others   538 3,374 3,912 7.44 
Total   22,602 29,996 52,598 100 
Source: GoB (2011: Table 4). 
Finally, Table 6 shows where the roughly US$50 billion in aid (in current dollars) to 
Bangladesh has come from over the period from 1971 to 2010. The sources have a 
significance that will be discussed later in the context of a contrast with Pakistan. Multilateral 
loans from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank 
accounted for around 40 per cent of aid to Bangladesh. Of the bilateral donors, Japan was the 
biggest, accounting for 13.4 per cent of the total. The US followed with around half the share 
of Japan. The share of the US declined further in the 2000s, accounting for less than 2 per 
cent of total aid to Bangladesh while the UK became the biggest bilateral donor in 2004, 
followed by Japan (Khan, S.  n.d.: Table 1). In contrast, we will see that US aid played a 
much more significant role in Pakistan. 
At its birth in 1971 at the end of a violent conflict, the Bangladeshi state had weak 
implementation capabilities. From 1971 to 1975 there was considerable political instability as 
the first government led by Sheikh Mujib struggled to impose order on the turbulent polity. 
The economic experiment of ‘socialism’ based on large-scale nationalizations led to 
11 
economic collapse as assets and resources were captured by party men of the ruling Awami 
League, and the disorder culminated in the imposition of one-party rule in 1974. This attempt 
to curtail democratic rights and a famine around the same time that led to hundreds of 
thousands of deaths virtually destroyed the legitimacy of the government. In August 1975 
Mujib and most of his family were assassinated and the military took over. After a period of 
uncertainty General Zia-ur-Rahman, a popular freedom fighter, became president in 1977. 
Zia initiated moves towards what I have elsewhere described as ‘authoritarian clientelism’, a 
system of controlled democracy that re-introduced multi-party competition (Khan, M. 
2012a). Parties were allowed to compete and individual politicians and parties were 
encouraged to join the ruling coalition but the implicit rule was that the top position could not 
be challenged. Zia’s period saw an economic turnaround and the emergence of the garment 
industry that was soon to transform Bangladeshi manufacturing. But Zia too was assassinated 
in 1981 and he was followed by the less popular General Ershad. He maintained the same 
political strategy but faced increasing challenges from opposition parties who wanted him to 
step down. Ershad was forced out in 1990 and since then there has been a competitive 
democracy with power alternating between the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) set up by 
Zia and the Awami League. However, democracy has been vulnerable with occasional crises 
when parties failed to agree about how to conduct elections. 
The political and institutional weaknesses in Bangladesh meant that aid delivery through state 
organizations was subject to implementation problems and leakages. By the 1980s, NGOs 
began to be celebrated as a distinctive aid delivery model. They were promoted not simply on 
the grounds of their comparative advantage in the logistics of some types of aid delivery but 
also because it was claimed they had governance advantages in representing and empowering 
the poor (White 1999). These ideas fitted in with the ideological turn in favour of 
liberalization and against state provision in the 1980s in international policy circles. Some 
Bangladeshi NGOs such as BRAC did indeed achieve good results in aid delivery, 
particularly to women and in remote areas. The share of aid channelled through NGOs has 
continued to grow. In 1990-91 10.5 per cent of total aid went through NGOs, and this grew to 
around 30 per cent of the total by 2005 (World Bank 2006: Table 3.1). These figures include 
the indirect receipts of NGOs as the government also purchases services from NGOs using 
aid funds. However, doubts were expressed in Bangladesh from the outset about the 
sufficiency of the NGO model of aid delivery. This included a concern about the extent to 
which NGOs actually represented ‘civil society’ as opposed to pursuing their own economic 
and political agendas (White 1999; Stiles 2002; World Bank 2006). Equivalent consolidated 
figures for the share of aid going through Pakistani NGOs are not easily available. This is 
partly because of the federal structure and partly because data from many donors are not 
easily available. The share of aid going through NGOs may be comparable to Bangladesh, 
but there are important differences in the structure of Pakistani NGOs. There are few large 
and well-organized Pakistani NGOs like BRAC, ASA or the Grameen Bank (which is a bank 
but with many characteristics of an NGO). Pakistani NGOs are relatively small and much of 
USAID spending in Pakistan in the 2000s, for instance, was routed through international 
(primarily US) NGOs (Cheema, U. 2009).  
The 1990s saw further important shifts in the analytical ideas informing aid delivery at the 
global policy level. ‘Good governance’ began to emerge as an important set of conditions 
required for developmental outcomes (Hermes and Lensink 2001; Khan, M. 2004, 2007). The 
role of the state was no longer to intervene to correct market failures, but rather to ensure 
efficient markets through ‘good governance’. Interventionist states were likely to result in 
adverse outcomes in most developing countries. The good governance state therefore 
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concentrates on enforcing the conditions for markets to be efficient, such as enforcing 
property rights, a rule of law and low corruption. By the end of the 1990s these conditions 
had become an important component of World Bank lending to Bangladesh, and other 
multilateral and bilateral donors began to follow this lead (Parnini 2009). From 2003 
Bangladesh was encouraged to claim ‘ownership’ of good governance priorities in the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers that provided a framework for coordinating aid (GoB 
2003, 2005, 2009). As in Bangladesh, the donor consensus in Pakistan also swung to a focus 
on good governance and economic liberalization, with a similar focus on Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (Anwar, T. 2002; GoP 2003, 2010).  
Bangladesh’s growth accelerated in the 1980s and further in the 1990s, but not because it 
made any progress in terms of indicators of good governance. Indeed on some of these 
indicators it actually retrogressed. This resulted in the World Bank describing the relationship 
between governance and growth in Bangladesh as a ‘paradox’ or a ‘conundrum’ (World Bank 
2007). An extensive literature has also evaluated aid in Bangladesh in terms of its impact on 
growth and poverty through the lens of standard economic variables like domestic savings. 
The general conclusion of much of this literature is that aid has had a limited or negative 
effect on long-term growth. One econometric study found that aid had a negative long-term 
effect on domestic savings between 1973 and 1998 (Razzaque and Ahmed 2000). In another 
study, the effect of aid on growth is marginal over 1973-99 because the positive effect of 
loans (which typically finance investment) is diluted by the consumption-enhancing effects of 
grants (Quazi 2005). In a similar vein, another study found that over 1972-88 foreign 
resources made no significant contribution to growth but loans were more effective than 
grants (Islam 1992). These studies are paradoxical in their own way because they suggest that 
economic performance may have been just as good or even better if Bangladesh had received 
no aid.  
The implicit conclusion may not be plausible for a number of reasons. First, relationships that 
hold for small variations in aid may not hold for big changes. If the evidence suggests that a 
5 per cent fall in aid is offset by an x% rise in domestic savings (where x may even be more 
than five) it does not follow that a 100 per cent fall in aid would be offset by a 20x% rise in 
domestic savings. Such significant offsetting effects are likely to require major institutional 
and political changes. A serious disruption of aid would indeed create institutional and 
political shocks but the outcomes of these shocks are unpredictable and may well result in 
institutional and political responses that are damaging rather than supportive of 
developmental outcomes. Second, the econometric identification of the effect of aid works by 
testing a fixed structure of lagged effects of aid in time series data. This approach may fail to 
identify the actual contribution of aid if the effects have a changing lag and intensity because 
the types of aid and policies are themselves changing over time. It may be more useful to 
examine plausible political economy links between aid, governance and economic 
performance that may not be ‘testable’ using econometric approaches but may be suggestive 
enough to support deeper empirical investigation.  
The configuration of aid flows to Pakistan displays some significant differences compared to 
Bangladesh. Four critical characteristics stand out in the data and can be summarized as 
follows. First, aid from the United States has been a significant part of the overall aid received 
by Pakistan. Second, military aid has been a significant component of overall US aid to 
Pakistan. Third, the volume of US economic aid has been strongly correlated with the 
volume of US military aid. And finally, military aid has fluctuated enormously with changing 
US perceptions about the geopolitical significance of Pakistan. While there are other donors in 
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Pakistan, given the leadership role of the US in global geopolitical decisions, US strategies are 
very likely to influence the strategies of other major donors in Pakistan. While there is always 
some amount of coordination across donors in a country, for a country that has a strategic 
position for the sole superpower, the formal and informal coordination of aid conditions is 
likely to be stronger than is usually the case. Taken together, these characteristics of the 
Pakistan aid package have meant that aid flows have fluctuated significantly over time and 
economic flows have been significant in periods when military flows have also been high. The 
variability of overall aid flows and the dominance of strategic and military considerations are 
significant features of aid to Pakistan and distinguish it from Bangladesh. In the next section 
we will examine the significance of this characteristic of aid to Pakistan.  
Table 7 shows that from 1971 to 2010, Pakistan too received around US$50 billion in net 
disbursed ODA in current dollars. The share of the USA in this was almost 20 per cent overall. 
In the 1960s the share of the USA was almost 70 per cent and in the 2000s almost 23 per cent. 
This compares with less than 7 per cent of aid to Bangladesh coming from the USA over 1971-
2010 (Table 6) and less than 2 per cent in the 2000s. For Pakistan, the important position of the 
USA matters because the changing security concerns of the latter can result in very significant 
swings in aid flows, which in turn affect the types of aid received and the conditions attached. 
Changes in US aid to Pakistan have sometimes been offset by other sources but have always 
resulted in changes in the types of aid coming in. In the 1970s when US aid to Pakistan 
significantly declined, compensating flows from other sources actually resulted in an increase 
in overall aid flows. In the 1980s the growth of US aid to Pakistan was associated with an even 
larger growth in overall aid flows to Pakistan. The almost total suspension of US aid in the 
1990s resulted in a virtual standstill in total aid flows, while the steep increase in US aid in 
the 2000s was associated with a virtual doubling of overall aid flows.  
Table 7: Net ODA disbursements to Pakistan, 1961-2010 (million current dollars) 
 Annual average net 
ODA disbursements 
% change on 
previous period  
Disbursements from USA 
(% share) 
% Change on 
previous period  
1961-70 413.1   277.0  (67.1%) 
1971-80 640.1 +54.9  110.6  (17.3%) -60.1 
1981-90 957.5 +49.6  154.7  (16.2%) +39.9 
1991-00 1037.2 +8.3  1.8  (0.2%) -98.9 
2001-10 1995.7 +92.4  455.9  (22.8%) +25669.4 
Source: Based on data in OECD (2013) 
 
Table 8: Average annual US aid by category to Pakistan, 1948–2010  (millions of dollars at constant 2009 prices) 
Year Economic assistance Military assistance* Total Aid Percentage military 
1951-60   788.7   292.0    1080.7 27.0 
1961-70 1458.4   142.9    1601.3   8.9 
1971-80   432.3       0.9      433.2   0.2 
1981-90   537.4   380.2      917.6 41.4 
1991-00     60.7       0.7       61.4   1.2 
2001-10   765.3  1313.1    2078.5  63.2 
Note: * Excluding covert military assistance. 
Source: Based on Elhai (2011).  
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Table 8 shows that the composition of US aid also varied quite significantly across different 
periods, with the share of military aid rising significantly in periods of increased aid. This 
simply reflects the fact that US aid to Pakistan has been primarily driven by US security 
concerns in the region. This is also shown graphically in Figure 2. Military aid was very high 
in the 1950s when Pakistan became a member of SEATO (the South East Asia Treaty 
Organization) and CENTO (the Central Treaty Organization) and was a key US ally in the 
Cold War. Economic aid was also very high in this period, and played an important role in 
supporting the high rates of economic growth that      Pakistan achieved in the 1950s and up 
to the mid 1960s. The first major decline happened in the mid-1960s when military aid was 
terminated after Pakistan went to war with India in 1965. US military aid to Pakistan 
remained negligible throughout the 1970s. Economic aid followed the decline in military aid 
and kept falling after the 1971 war with India that resulted in the birth of Bangladesh. After 
the loss of East Pakistan in 1971, Bhutto became prime minister of what remained of 
Pakistan. His economic strategies of nationalization and populism were in any case unlikely 
to be supported by economic assistance from the USA. In 1977 Bhutto was overthrown in a 
military coup led by General Zia-ul-Haq and Bhutto was executed in 1979. 
Figure 2: US economic and military aid to Pakistan, 1950–2010 
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By an unfortunate coincidence the military takeover in Pakistan coincided with the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Pakistan became a frontline state for the USA in its 
confrontation with the Soviets. US military aid shot up in the 1980s, as did economic aid. 
Thus, the return to military rule coincided not only with a steep increase in US aid, but also a 
steep increase in military aid and an unknown increase in covert military aid. Pakistan played 
a critical role in the defeat of the Soviets in 1988 and the Soviet Union itself underwent 
fundamental transformation in 1989. With the fall of the Soviet Union, Pakistan’s importance 
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for US regional strategy also collapsed. In 1988 General Zia died in a somewhat mysterious 
air crash and was succeeded by the elected government of Benazir Bhutto, daughter of the 
Bhutto he had executed. Throughout the 1980s while the Afghan campaign was going on, the 
USA knew that Pakistan had a nuclear programme. Indeed in 1985 Congress passed the 
Pressler Amendment that made economic and military aid to Pakistan conditional on an 
annual presidential certification that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon and that US 
aid would ‘significantly reduce’ the risk of Pakistan acquiring one. The required annual 
certification was dutifully provided by US presidents throughout the Afghan war. However, 
when the war ended in 1989 President George H.W. Bush decided he could no longer provide 
the requisite certification (ICG 2012: 2-3). Military and economic aid to Pakistan dropped 
precipitately with a corresponding decline in the trust the Pakistani establishment reposed in 
the USA.  
The 1990s were a period of weak civilian governments marked by intense internal political 
conflicts and the lowest growth rates in Pakistan’s history (Table 1). US economic aid was 
close to zero through this period, but aid from multilateral agencies and other bilateral donors 
kept overall levels of aid stable in nominal terms (Table 7). However, as we saw earlier, aid 
was increasingly linked to good governance goals at this time. The decade ended with 
another crisis as Pakistan responded to Indian nuclear tests in 1998 with its own nuclear tests 
and became a nuclear armed country. Economic sanctions followed and Pakistan’s isolation 
increased further with the military coup that brought General Musharraf to power in 1999. 
However, by another fateful coincidence, September 11th (2001) resulted in another dramatic 
change as Pakistan once again became a frontline state for the US just after a military 
takeover within the country. All other concerns were shelved and US military aid shot up 
again, followed by a rise in economic aid, and this time military aid actually outstripped 
economic aid. Musharraf stayed in power till 2007 when he was brought down by a 
movement for the restoration of democracy. While Pakistan enjoyed a small increase in aid in 
nominal terms in the 1990s and a more significant increase in the 2000s, the aid in the two 
periods was driven by very different factors. In the 1990s aid to Pakistan primarily came from 
non-US multilateral sources with a focus on lending for liberalization and improvements in 
‘good governance’. The increase in aid in the 2000s was driven by US security concerns in 
Afghanistan and the aid came with a significant military component (Zaidi 2011).  
The understandable Pakistani perception that the US was only interested in pursuing its own 
security interests was, of course, ultimately damaging for US influence in Pakistan. By the 
late 2000s, and particularly after the restoration of democracy in 2007, the US was engaged 
in a significant re-evaluation of its aid mix largely because aid was failing to buy the support 
of the Pakistani people. In 2009 the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, also known as the Enhanced 
Partnership with Pakistan Act, authorized a tripling of civilian aid to Pakistan to US$7.5 
billion over five years. It was also decided to help strengthen government by channelling 
more of the aid through government institutions rather than (largely international) NGOs. 
However, the proposed expansion of civilian aid did not take place. The political relationship 
between Pakistan and the USA deteriorated significantly after the 2 May 2011 US raid that 
targeted Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad and the NATO airstrikes in November that killed 24 
Pakistani soldiers (ICG 2012). Security concerns, Pakistani reluctance to authorize projects 
involving international NGOs and the weakness of government institutions in delivering aid 
meant that the proposed increase in civilian aid was not achieved. At the same time stricter 
conditions were imposed on military aid after the embarrassment to both sides following the 
Abbottabad incident.  
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The long history of dramatic fluctuations in military and economic aid to Pakistan raises 
questions about US strategic calculations. The utility of Pakistan as a launching pad for 
regional security strategies clearly varied over time but this in itself does not explain why US 
aid flows to Pakistan should have varied so dramatically in the last four decades. It may have 
been more rational for the USA to sustain a substantial flow of economic aid to maintain a 
close relationship with Pakistan over time. The doubts on the Pakistani side about US 
intentions could well have contributed to the increasingly qualified support Pakistan provided 
that the US, in turn, found increasingly irksome. One possibility is that successful Indian 
lobbying in the US and the US interest in maintaining good relations with India for economic 
and political reasons exerted significant checks on sustained US aid to Pakistan. These 
pressures may have been strong enough to block aid to Pakistan except at moments of deep 
crisis (Anwar and Michaelowa 2006). Whatever the underlying cause, the variability of US 
aid and its correlation with obvious security goals have clearly constrained US influence in 
Pakistan.  
Aid to Pakistan was most developmental in the 1950s and 1960s when it was closely linked 
to development projects. In 1964 aid amounted to around 5 per cent of GDP, when GDP was 
growing at almost 7 per cent a year (Zaidi 2011: 3). In the 1960s US aid accounted for around 
67 per cent of all ODA (Table 7). Most US aid at that time was economic, with US military 
aid accounting for less than 9 per cent of the US total ( 
Table 8). Not surprisingly, the first half of the 1960s witnessed the most dynamic growth in 
Pakistan’s history and an appropriate structure of aid was an important contributor to this 
growth (Amjad 1982). Not surprisingly, support for the US in Pakistan was at its peak during 
this period. Aid contributed to infrastructure projects and provided finance for lending by 
development banks like the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP) and the 
Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC) that provided long-term credit 
on easy terms for investors in new sectors. The internal political arrangements in Pakistan in 
the early 1960s were also conducive for supporting the development of entrepreneurial 
capabilities in new sectors that were being developed. Both the political arrangements and the 
aid flows were disrupted in the second half of the 1960s and neither were to be reconstituted 
in quite the same way again (Khan, M. 1999). Constructive critics of the US aid strategy in 
Pakistan have pointed out that if US goals in Pakistan are to be realized, aid has to be targeted 
towards developmental outcomes. This would require, for instance, using more of the aid to 
co-finance private investments and insure against investment risks in difficult areas as well to 
support a range of infrastructure projects (Birdsall et al. 2011). In short, it would require a 
return to the aid strategies of the early 1960s but in a very different global economy and with 
different internal political challenges.  
4 Aid and institution-building in Bangladesh and Pakistan  
The political economy of Bangladesh and Pakistan appear to have a number of similarities in 
terms of their policies and institutions and dominant types of organizations even after the split 
in 1971. Immediately after 1971 both went through a period of populist authoritarianism 
under Bhutto in Pakistan and Mujib in Bangladesh. This was a period of democratic opening 
after a decade of military rule in the 1960s. The result was great instability as new political 
forces jostled to capture rents. In both countries charismatic leaders attempted to control these 
forces using increasingly authoritarian methods. In both cases nationalization was used to 
create jobs for party supporters and in both cases the leadership turned to increasingly 
authoritarian methods as political demands outstripped the capacity of the system to deliver 
rents. In Bangladesh the authoritarianism ultimately took the form of a one-party state while 
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in Pakistan Bhutto was accused of winning elections by rigging and murdering his political 
opponents (Burki 1980; Wolpert 1993; Khan, M. 2012a, 2013).  
Despite these similarities there were important differences between the two countries. The 
war of 1971 in Bangladesh had destroyed the political power of the dominant economic and 
political classes. As many of the old economic and political elites were non-Bengali, they 
simply left the country at its independence. The few Bengali capitalists were also 
expropriated through nationalizations in the early 1970s. Political competition was now 
driven by new political entrepreneurs from the previously excluded lower-middle classes 
whose higher echelons were now engaged in creating new organizations (initially within the 
Awami League umbrella) to pursue their own rent seeking strategies. The competition for 
rents between these groups resulted in political turbulence and violence, initially within the 
Awami League and then between it and factions that began to defect from it. However, on the 
economic front, this process also resulted in the emergence of entirely new classes with 
money, some of whom could potentially become a productive investing class. In Pakistan, 
Bhutto’s populist rhetoric did indeed mobilize the poor as never before but much of the old 
political classes remained in control of political organizations. The potential upward mobility 
of new lower-middle class political organizers was, therefore, much less than in Bangladesh. 
At the same time, Bhutto’s attack on big capitalists through nationalizations inflicted a blow 
on the old economically dominant classes. But here there was no equivalent rupture of 
political organizations that would allow new classes of moneyed individuals to rapidly 
emerge from below through rent capture. Thus, Bhutto’s strategy in Pakistan had a double 
negative effect on economic dynamism. The old large capitalist class that may have played a 
productive role in a new cycle of investment was weakened and demoralized. But a new class 
of potential medium-sized capitalists, with the potential of developing smaller firms using 
cheaper labour-intensive technologies, was also constrained from emerging at a rapid pace. 
In both countries, the populist authoritarianism of the early 1970s was overthrown by military 
coups at about the same time, in 1975 in Bangladesh and 1977 in Pakistan. A decade and a 
half of military rule followed in both. However, military rule in Pakistan turned out to be 
more authoritarian and centralized, helped by the upsurge in US security aid to the military 
leadership following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This strengthened an authoritarian 
and centralized leadership and allowed it to postpone yet again the entry of intermediate class 
political organizers in the competition over rents. General Zia-ul-Haq ruled initially through 
an appointed council or Majlis-e-Shoora set up in 1980. It appeared that he may be 
encouraging the mobilization of new social forces because he attempted to create 
countervailing organizations against Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) by promoting 
weaker political organizations like the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), and by encouraging 
the formation of new Islamist groups. However, in the end, Zia’s strategy did not result in 
any fundamental change in the groups that dominated political rent seeking in Pakistan 
despite the fact that in Pakistan, as elsewhere in the Indian subcontinent, new aspirations and 
mobilizations were developing particularly in the lower-middle classes. The new Islamist 
parties that sought to mobilize some of these forces were in the end not incorporated into the 
dominant structures of rent allocation. The biggest long-term beneficiary of Zia’s rule was the 
PML, eventually led by Nawaz Sharif. The Sharif brothers were members of an established 
business family and the party therefore had greater appeal for the business community, but 
lower down its organizational hierarchy it depended on political entrepreneurs who were very 
similar to those in the PPP. Thus, despite Zia’s rhetoric of radical Islamism the political 
classes that led the competition for rents remained substantially unchanged at the end of his 
rule (Lieven 2011: 76-80). Zia’s death in an air crash in 1988 resulted in a ‘democratic 
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transition’ which saw the return of the old ‘feudal’ and upper-middle class elites who were 
still substantially in control of the two organizations dominating the competition for rents: the 
old PPP and the PML, now called the PML-N (the PML faction led by Nawaz Sharif).  
The failure of Pakistan to achieve a gradual change in its political order at this critical 
juncture was at least partly due to the steep increase in military aid in the 1980s that 
happened for external reasons. The Afghan war brought windfalls in the form of overt and 
covert military aid routed to the top echelons of the army and intelligence agencies. The 
effects of these flows can be understood by imagining the counterfactual: what would have 
happened if the highest levels of the military and political establishment did not have access 
to these rents at this time. Zia was attempting to build new organizations and constituencies 
to counter the old political leadership of the PPP. In the absence of cash that could be 
allocated from above to buy off the more pliable lower-level organizers and suppress the 
others, the bargaining power of new organizers, including the Islamist ones that Zia 
ostensibly patronized, would have been significantly greater. In a context where the old 
political organizers were in disarray, new lower-level political entrepreneurs may have found 
it easier to enter the mainstream and compete for a different set of rents. In the absence of 
cash rents that could be allocated from above, the lower-level ‘Islamist’ and other lower-
middle class organizers may have competed for accumulation through government contracts, 
business opportunities and access to finance.  
If this had happened, Pakistan’s trajectory may have been different. Fewer of the lower-
middle classes would have felt so excluded as to support violent activities against the state 
and against other groups as happened later. Moreover, conservative Islam may have 
developed a productive base, as in Turkey, that could have moderated its politics, apart from 
contributing to a sustainable growth of the economy. Instead, Zia achieved what Lieven 
rightly described as ‘shallow’ economic growth, based on a service and construction boom 
financed by cash inflows from aid and remittances from Pakistanis in the Middle East 
(Lieven 2011: 78). Even more damaging was that organizational power did not shift lower 
down Pakistan’s polity and new lower-middle class organizers failed to develop significant 
organizational power despite Zia’s rhetoric of supporting new Islamist groups against the old 
political elites.   
The contrast with Bangladesh is particularly interesting because the political transitions in the 
two countries had some common features at this time. Mujib was assassinated in August 
1975. General Zia-ur-Rahman in Bangladesh was not directly involved in the coup but 
emerged as the new leader in November after a series of coups. Although the coups appeared 
to be similar, Bangladesh’s Zia and later Ershad had to devise institutional and political 
mechanisms for managing a highly mobilized polity organized by a large number of 
lower-middle class organizers. The war of independence of 1971 had inducted many political 
entrepreneurs from the lower-middle classes into active organizational roles and military 
rulers in Bangladesh had no realistic possibility of controlling all of them from above. Instead 
Zia formed an umbrella party organization to incorporate the most effective new organizers 
and organizations and managed to achieve political stability by enabling the most powerful 
organizations to access rents. In this context, the structure of aid mattered. It was helpful that 
Bangladesh did not receive any significant security-related aid that could be controlled from 
above. The one party system that the Awami League had attempted to introduce had failed 
because there were too many aspiring organizers and organizations to satisfy with rent 
allocations from above given the limited supply of centrally allocated resources. Greater 
repression or a new supply of centrally-allocated rents may have allowed the one-party 
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system to survive for a while, but its eventual violent collapse was almost inevitable given the 
continuous growth in the number of organizations and their demands.  
Zia’s strategy was to encourage multi-party competition to identify the most powerful and 
effective organizers and to incorporate them selectively within the ruling party that he 
created, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, or BNP. Political competition established the 
relative bargaining power of competing claimants and the demands of the most effective 
organizers were met by allowing decentralized rent capture in the form of allocations of 
contracts and business opportunities (Khan, M. 2012a, 2013). The characteristic of this 
system of ‘authoritarian clientelism’ was that the organizational power of new groups 
including those that had been suppressed in the one-party system was recognized and rents 
selectively allocated to powerful groups. The only restriction was that the position of the 
president could not be challenged. Ershad continued this arrangement and set up his own 
party the Jatiyo Party (JP), but he enjoyed much lower legitimacy to begin with. By the late 
1980s political organizations had become sufficiently powerful to reject the implicitly 
permanent position of the president and Ershad was forced out by a movement for the 
restoration of democracy in 1990. However, by then quasi-military rule in Bangladesh had 
enabled a transition from a system of constrained political competition to one where a wider 
range of patron-client political organizations were recognized and finally allowed to engage 
in open competition with each other in a ‘competitive clientelist’ democracy (Khan, M. 
2012a, 2013).  
The periods of quasi-military rule in Bangladesh under Zia’s BNP and later Ershad’s JP were 
important for the democratic transition because new political entrepreneurs gained confidence 
that they could compete for access to political rents without recourse to extremist or violent 
politics. As a result, political violence involving political organizations paradoxically 
declined over this period even though the competition for the presidency remained violent in 
the form of repeated coup attempts within the army, which eventually resulted in the 
assassination of Zia. No less important was that there were limited cash rents that could be 
allocated from above and so many powerful organizers and their supporters could only be 
accommodated by allowing them to capture rents from the creation of business opportunities. 
This resulted in the emergence of a new smaller asset-owning class that could potentially 
replace the old large capitalists who had been destroyed by war and nationalization. 
In this context, the structure of aid to Bangladesh was fortuitous because it did not go against 
the grain of these potentially favourable social processes. Very little of the aid was security-
based and so the president did not control significant rents at the centre. This affected the 
balance of power between the president and the organizations that he needed to 
accommodate. Cash could not be allocated from above to create or destroy organizations nor 
could national security arguments be easily used to suppress powerful organizations. The 
most effective mechanism of maintaining the ruling coalition was to recognize the actual 
organizational power of different organizations and allow them to capture rents available in 
the local economy, for instance through business opportunities. The aid that was coming in 
was for general development purposes and the rents available in organizing delivery were 
open to competition and capture by a much larger group of organizations. A growing share of 
this aid was also channelled through a range of local NGOs that rapidly developed their 
capabilities. The socially committed leaderships of these NGOs were also a product of the 
liberation war. The NGOs provided rents to their motivated and organizationally competent 
leaders who (apart from being good at delivering services) may otherwise have engaged in 
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political competition. The aid flows to Bangladesh were therefore stabilizing in a number of 
respects given the organizational evolution of politics and economics in the country.  
Apart from stabilizing politics, the broad-based political accumulation in Bangladesh also 
created a base of potential capitalists. Promoting economic investments did not cost much in 
terms of centralized resource allocation and was politically beneficial because it created a 
potential flow of future revenues. President Zia provided critical policy support for investors 
in a variety of sectors, seeking productive investment outlets for them, finding foreign 
partners and introducing selective policy measures to support investments in new sectors. 
These steps were critical for the emergence of the garments industry in the late 1970s (Khan, 
M. 2012a, 2013). This would eventually become the most important manufacturing sector in 
Bangladesh, providing jobs for almost five million workers and earning 80 per cent of 
Bangladesh’s foreign exchange by 2011. Pakistan’s President Zia displayed no similar 
compulsion in pushing his capitalists towards global competitiveness. He did support the 
Sharif brothers in the PML but as political entrepreneurs to balance the PPP, not as economic 
entrepreneurs who would bring in new technologies to create new jobs and earn foreign 
exchange. The structure of aid was at least one factor explaining the weaker compulsion for 
promoting new economic activities in Pakistan. The policy support for productive sectors in 
Bangladesh should not be exaggerated. Nevertheless, there was a greater compulsion for 
military rulers in Bangladesh to support productive investments during the critical period of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
The 1990s saw a return to democracy in both countries, but a democracy that was vulnerable 
because of intense conflicts between competing parties. The 1990s also witnessed a policy 
shift amongst donors to provide stronger support for liberalization and good governance 
reforms. Both countries supported liberalizing policies but their achievements in terms of 
improving ‘good governance’ were negligible as we would expect in terms of our discussion 
in section 1. Liberalization had different effects in the two countries. In Bangladesh the 
garments industry was emerging out of the policy support provided in the late 1970s and 
1980s and its rapid growth throughout the 1990s helped to raise the overall growth rate of the 
economy. In Pakistan there were no new globally competitive industries that could drive 
growth. The greater access to markets and exposure to competition which liberalization 
brought was of little benefit to a country that had no significant productive sectors that were 
globally competitive or close to achieving competitiveness.  
While the US security aid to Pakistan in the 1980s is likely to have had adverse effects on the 
incentives and strategies of the ruling coalition, the steep and sudden cutback in US aid in the 
1990s had a different set of adverse effects. Political stability was adversely affected as 
established patterns of rent distribution were disrupted at the very moment when political 
competition intensified. No elected party managed to complete its term in office. The weak 
ruling parties of this period had neither the ability nor the time horizon to support rent 
allocation for productive capability development. Aid from multilateral agencies increased so 
that nominal aid inflows were maintained but an increasing part of this was now general 
support for governance reforms like decentralization, a process that was further accelerated 
under Musharraf’s rule in the 2000s (Cheema et al. 2005). Aid supporting ‘good governance’ 
reforms of this type is unlikely to make a significant contribution to economic development. 
Improvements in ‘good governance’ are unlikely to be big enough to significantly improve 
the efficiency of markets given the structural constraints limiting the enforcement of good 
governance in developing countries. Nevertheless, aid to Pakistan in the 1990s is likely to 
have had marginally positive effects on poverty reduction and also on political stability by 
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providing some additional resources to the political system in the form of margins and 
leakages to meet some of the demands for rent allocation. However, economic growth was 
low and this made the political corruption of both the PPP and the PML-N increasingly 
intolerable to the public and prepared the way for Musharraf’s coup in 1999. 
Many features of democracy in Bangladesh in the 1990s were similar to those of Pakistan 
with the important difference being that in Bangladesh a globally competitive garments and 
textiles industry continued to drive growth. Once set up, the sector grew through the 
replication of firms regardless of poor governance. However, poor regulation would 
eventually take a toll in industrial accidents like the Rana Plaza collapse of 2013 that killed 
more than 1100 workers. As in Pakistan, intense political competition between weak political 
parties created a broadly shared perception of poor governance and high levels of political 
corruption. In Bangladesh too, external assistance for good governance reforms and the 
linking of aid to conditions such as anti-corruption measures achieved very little in terms of 
actually reducing corruption or improving the rule of law. Moreover, competing political 
parties failed even to achieve ‘live and let live’ compromises in the organization of elections 
so that elections continued to be periods of violence and uncertainty.  
Both countries suffered suspensions of democracy in the 2000s. Democracy in Pakistan was 
suspended for eight years under Musharraf from 1999 to 2007 while Bangladesh had a two-
year emergency government with military backing from 2007 to 2009 following an electoral 
crisis in Bangladesh in 2007. This government, led by an ex-World Bank bureaucrat, 
Fakhruddin Ahmed, enjoyed the support of donors as it promised to carry out a raft of good 
governance measures under emergency laws. These included an anti-corruption drive that 
swept up the leaders of the two main parties and thousands of others. The end result was a 
missed opportunity because the emergency government attempted to enforce good 
governance rules that were actually unenforceable but failed to identify feasible enforceable 
reforms that may have made a difference to political and economic outcomes in the country 
(Khan, M. 2012a).  
In contrast the Musharraf interregnum in Pakistan lasted much longer, from 1999 to 2007, 
and arguably did much more serious damage to Pakistan’s developmental prospects. Once 
again, it was unfortunate for Pakistan that a military coup was closely followed by a 
significant change in US strategic interests and a massive upsurge in military aid. This time 
the security aid did not just enable a top-down allocation of rents with its damaging political 
consequences. Pakistan’s engagement with the US now led to a gradual but growing crisis of 
legitimacy for the state and growing extremist violence. One reason why this episode was 
much worse for Pakistan was that this time US aims in the region were not easily achievable 
and the war in Afghanistan was probably not even potentially winnable. This resulted in a 
complex and ultimately self-defeating game being played by the military-bureaucratic elite in 
Pakistan that sapped its own legitimacy over time.  
Access to American aid in the post 9/11 context required the Pakistani regime to sign on to 
the US-led ‘war on terror’ that went against the military’s own perception of its strategic 
interests in Afghanistan and the sentiments of many Pakistanis in the border areas who shared 
the Pashtoon ethnicity of the Afghan Taliban. The Pakistani state found itself in the worst of 
all possible worlds. Its own strategic concerns prevented it from supporting the US agenda 
fully or unconditionally and this displeased the Americans. But its military and political 
support for US goals went far enough to lose it support at home in the strategic and weakly 
governed border areas. Musharraf later argued in his memoirs that the USA had given him an 
ultimatum after 9/11 to fall in line or ‘be bombed back to the Stone Age’ (Musharraf 2006: 
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200-1). Even if true (and the US denied making any such threat), the targeting of significant 
security aid to the top leadership was undoubtedly a strong incentive and once again this had 
severely adverse effects on economic and political developments in Pakistan. The security 
rents allocated to the centre skewed the relative power of the ruling coalition vis-à-vis all 
other political organizations. Once again, substantive accommodation could be delayed and 
strategies of by-passing powerful organizations with a combination of repression and buying 
in of support from weaker organizations could be attempted. In the end, these strategies have 
always failed in Pakistan, yet a supply of cash to the centre repeatedly creates the temptation 
to try such a strategy one more time. Indeed, even after 2008 when a weak PPP government 
was elected to power, the US alliance was not substantially challenged and the flow of aid 
rents continued.  
Pakistan in the 2000s was an extreme case demonstrating the distorting effects of aid. Its 
ruling coalition voluntarily accepted payments to support foreign policies that it did not fully 
believe in, and which were unlikely in any case to succeed, and as a result suffered from 
declining legitimacy. At the same time, the access to centralized rents allowed it to continue 
with top-down policies of limiting political access that were ultimately unsustainable. A 
Pakistani government dependent on its own resources and needing to construct a sustainable 
coalition would be rapidly forced to allow the many more political organizations to enter the 
competition for rents. It would also be unlikely to attempt to forcefully suppress 
organizations that were politically opposed to foreign policies that the ruling coalition itself 
was not fully committed to. The loss of legitimacy that followed, on top of the exclusion of 
significant elements of the lower intermediate classes in Pakistan resulted in growing internal 
violence and sectarianism as excluded groups mobilized to challenge the system as a whole. 
The PML-N that formed a coalition government after the 2013 elections was committed to a 
renegotiation of the security alliance with the US and this may become possible as the US 
interest in Afghanistan wanes and the possibility of a change in its regional strategy emerges. 
Thus, in Pakistan while the good governance rhetoric of Musharraf was similar to that of 
Fakhruddin, the implications were much more severe than just wasted opportunities of 
feasible reform. The outcome was a growth in violence and a loss of state legitimacy that 
continued to plague the country even after the return of democracy in 2008.  
5 Conclusions 
Aid can contribute to determining economic and political outcomes by modifying some of the 
macro-political incentives facing economic and political organizations. The economic and 
political outcomes that follow can in turn affect the ongoing strategies of organizations, 
thereby setting up cycles of cumulative causation that can be good or bad for the gradual 
attainment of economic and political development. The effects of foreign assistance in 
vulnerable countries characterized by weak formal governance structures are best evaluated 
in this type of dialectical analysis, taking into account differences in the initial structure of 
formal and informal organizations and the ways in which they are competing for rents, 
differences in geopolitical positions determining the composition of aid and therefore of aid-
based rent opportunities, and the path-dependent effects of these differences on the further 
evolution of economic and political strategies. While aid was a relatively small part of the 
GNP of both countries, when we look at these interactive effects, it probably had significant 
multiplier effects on the evolution of social stability or fragility in these countries.  
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The policy implications of our analysis are complex. In the case of countries like Pakistan 
facing significant internal violence, the new analysis of security and development suggests 
that development aid should have a greater security focus (World Bank 2011). However, the 
initial conditions in the country and the adverse effects of centralized rents on political 
strategies have meant that military and security aid to Pakistan has had very damaging long-
term implications. Security-related aid in the 1980s blocked the incremental inclusion of 
political organizers from the lower-middle classes building up potential conflicts for the 
future. The second upsurge of security-related aid in the 2000s had even more serious 
consequences by undermining the legitimacy of the state and allowed excluded groups to 
mobilize along extremist agendas. Donors are clearly wrong if they believe that their security 
interests can be furthered by ramping up security-related aid to clients who promise to help in 
the achievement of donor security goals. Aid always interfaces with internal political and 
economic processes of competition over rents that are country specific and need to be 
understood. Of course countries like Pakistan could renegotiate or opt out of assistance that is 
so damaging. But aid creates powerful constituencies who benefit from it, and opting out may 
be difficult, as the Pakistani experience repeatedly demonstrates. It is therefore also important 
to persuade donors that a simple-minded security strategy justified by a simplistic association 
between security and development may harm their own long-term interests if the countries 
they are assisting become more fragile and violent as a result.  
In less violent countries like Bangladesh, the challenge is to understand better the vulnerable 
processes through which economic and political progress has been achieved. The challenge is 
to identify feasible institutional changes that build on these successes without attempting 
ambitious ‘good governance’ reforms that evidence suggests cannot be implemented. 
Attempting to use aid as an instrument to achieve ‘good governance’ has repeatedly proved to 
be a misguided strategy. These attempts resulted in missed opportunities of supporting 
feasible institutional improvements to sustain development. Sustaining development may in 
turn be the most feasible way of strengthening ‘good governance’ over time. In particular, the 
development of new productive capabilities requires rent allocation strategies to firms and 
sectors to enhance their competitiveness. These strategies have to work with the formal and 
informal governance structures of the country and with feasible improvements in these 
conditions. Since developmental rent allocations did succeed in creating new sectors such as 
garments and textiles in Bangladesh, the challenge is to understand these examples properly 
so that policy and assistance can be appropriately targeted to new sectors like electronics 
(Khan, M. 2013). A better understanding of the formal and informal rent allocation 
mechanisms through which incremental developmental outcomes were achieved in countries 
like Bangladesh can help to design feasible institutional changes that aid could support. Once 
again, country specificities are important and the possible interactions of aid and domestic 
accumulation processes need to be much better understood.  
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